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PWR Operator Manual · Open the simulator

09 — Setpoints, Limits, and Normal Values

Document: PWR-SP-01
Title: Operating Limits and Protection Setpoints — PWR
Revision: 24
Source: the as-built plant; normal values captured from the live engine

NOTE: Values are trainer setpoints (SI). Real US plant Tech Specs differ.

Plant MODES: Mode 1, At Power = Power Operation (power > 5 %); Mode 2, Startup = Startup (critical ≤ 5 %); Mode 3, Hot Standby = Hot Standby; Mode 5, Cold Shutdown is simulated and is the cold end of this plant — cold_shutdown and hot_shutdown are Free Play initial conditions and the Mode 5 ↔ Mode 1 heatup/cooldown runs on integrated physics. See 05_MODE_TRANSITIONS.md.


1.0 Normal operating point — Mode 1, At Power (Hot Full Power)

ParameterNominalMODE
Reactor power100 %Mode 1, At Power
Electrical output≈ 100 MWeMode 1, At Power
Primary pressure2235 psi (15.41 MPa)Mode 1, At Power
Tavg≈ 580.4 °F (304.7 °C)Mode 1, At Power
Thot / Tcold≈ 609.8 / 550.9 °F (321.0 / 288.3 °C) (ΔT ≈ 58.9 °F / 32.7 °C)Mode 1, At Power
Pressurizer level≈ 62 %Mode 1, At Power
Steam Generator level≈ 65 %Mode 1, At Power
Secondary steam pressure≈ 827 psi (5.70 MPa) — measured on a settled ride; Ginna's sourced 810 psig full-load outlet is the anchor it was tuned toMode 1, At Power
Subcooling margin≈ 43 °F (23.9 °C)Mode 1, At Power
Control bank position96.7 % withdrawn (606 of 627 steps)Mode 1, At Power
Core inventory100 %Mode 1, At Power
Decay heat (after long power run)≈ 6.2 % at scram instant—

Mode 3, Hot Standby — Hot Standby (typical)

ParameterNominal
Power~1e-6 normalized (source equilibrium)
Control bankFully inserted
Subcritical margin~−1000 pcm class
SR detectorEnergized
T/POperating (hot) — still Mode 3, Hot Standby, not Mode 5, Cold Shutdown
Free Play IChot_zero_power

2.0 Reactor Protection System (RPS) trips → SCRAM

Instrument / conditionDirectionSetpointNotes
Power range (high)high115 %Full-power high flux. The accident-analysis setpoint (Ginna TS Bases B 3.4.4; the UFSAR's 118 % is a conservative bound for rod ejection only). The 103 % rod stop (§2.0) sits below it, so the stop acts first
Power range (low setpoint)high35 %Startup; blockable above P-10
TavghighNOT MODELLEDA real plant trips on high average coolant temperature. This one does not — the overtemperature ΔT trip below covers the same ground here, on the sourced Table 15.0-7 equation. Kept so the contrast is visible, not because the plant will act on it
Primary pressurehigh2425 psi (16.72 MPa)
Primary pressurelow1775 psi (12.24 MPa)
PZR levellowNOT MODELLEDA real plant trips the reactor on low pressurizer level. This one does not: the 17 % letdown-isolation and heater cut (§6.0, annunciated PZR LTDN ISOL) is the only low-level action, and the plant will keep running below it. Kept so the contrast is visible
SG levellow17 %Lo-lo; the same signal auto-starts AFW (single-signal, as in the real plant)
SG level (P-14)high90 %High-high; reactor trip via P-9, condition ≥50 % power
Turbine trip (P-9)turbine tripped—Reactor trip on turbine trip, condition ≥50 % power (P-9). Above P-9 a turbine trip scrams the reactor immediately — it is not a ride-out. Below P-9 there is no reactor trip and the steam dump carries the transient. A planned offline (generator OFF / disconnect_grid) is not a turbine trip and never arms this — see 03 §12.1
RCS loop flowlow87 % of ratedLow-flow trip; reads the loop_flow elbow-tap channel. Blockable below P-7 (8 % power), auto-reinstates above. Real Westinghouse setpoint. One channel, not 2-of-3 — see 12 §10.7 for that departure and what it costs
Source rangehigh1e5 cpsReactor trip, blockable at P-6 (IR ≥ 1e-10 A) on the Trip Blocks panel's SR HIGH FLUX row; the block also switches the detector off, and clears itself below 5e-11 A. Sourced — WTSM 9.1 (ML11223A263): the source range "HIGH FLUX LEVEL REACTOR TRIP setpoint (10^5 cps)". Until 2026-09-26 this plant had no such trip — the channel switched itself off at 1e5 cps (owner directive 2026-09-01, superseded by the owner's ruling of 2026-09-26)
Intermediate rangehigh25 % (2.08e-3 A)Startup; blockable above P-10, and the SAME press clears the 20 % rod stop below. This row used to read 1.67e-3 A / “~20 %” — the retired plant’s number, and it was the ROD STOP’s setpoint written into the TRIP’s row. Same channel, two setpoints: the stop at 20 % acts first, this trip at 25 % is what happens if it does not hold. Sourced: WTSM 12.2 §12.2.3.3 (ML11223A301) — “the current output from at least one of the two intermediate range channels indicates greater than the equivalent of 25% power”. Ginna publishes no number for this Function (UFSAR ch15 §B: “a pre-selected, manually adjustable setpoint”), so the generic Westinghouse figure is the sourced one
Primary pressure (SI trip, PI-3)low1715 psi (11.824 MPa)Reactor trip on safety injection; blockable below P-11 (1973 psi (13.6 MPa)), auto-reinstates. Every safety injection trips the reactor, whichever signal actuated it (WTSM 12.3.2.2: "Reactor trip: A trip shuts down the reactor if one has not already occurred") — including the unblockable containment backup in §3.0, which is the one path that reaches injection with the reactor still at power. A latched SI holds the trip in: reset SI before the RPS
PZR level (PI-8)high87 %Going-solid backstop, and it is the anchor plant's figure rather than the four-loop 92 %. Armed above P-7; the 70 % alarm warns first
Overtemperature ΔT (OTΔT)low marginvariable (calculated)Core protection against departure from nucleate boiling. Compares indicated loop ΔT against a setpoint that MOVES with average temperature and reactor coolant pressure — the same ΔT is safe at one condition and a trip at another, which is what no single-parameter trip can see. Cannot be blocked (WTSM 12.2 Table 12.2-1, "No Interlocks"). Board readout: core ΔT margin, NIS card
Overpower ΔT (OPΔT)low marginvariable (calculated)Core protection against excessive heat rate in the fuel (kW/ft). Same loop-ΔT signal, compensated for average temperature only. Cannot be blocked. Its design-basis events include the steam line break — before it existed, a 30 % break held the core at 114 % power for thirty minutes with no reactor trip

Permissives / blocks

NameValueEffect
P-6IR ≥ 1e-10 APermits the manual source-range block — the SR HIGH FLUX row on the Trip Blocks panel, which blocks the source-range trip and switches the detector off (one control here; a real plant uses two pushbuttons). Resets below 5E-11 A: on the way down the block clears itself and the detector re-energizes. Also the bottom of the INTER RANGE in-use band on the NIS card. Sourced — Ginna Technical Specification Bases B 3.3.1 (ML20339A221): "actuated when any NIS intermediate range channel goes approximately one decade (1 E-10 amps) above the minimum channel reading". The 5E-11 A in the same passage is a different point — the reset, "on decreasing power, the P-6 interlock automatically energizes the NIS source range detectors and enables the Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip at 5E-11 amps" — and the engine used to carry it as P-6
P-9Power ≥ 50 %Arms the reactor trip on turbine trip and the P-14 reactor trip; also gates the loss-of-MFW AFW start
P-7Power ≥ 8 %Arms the low-flow reactor trip and the high pressurizer level trip; below it neither is active (RCPs are secured in Mode 5, where RHR provides circulation) and both re-arm above. 8 %, not 10 % — the anchor plant puts P-7 and P-10 at the same crossing: Ginna Technical Specification Bases B 3.3.1 (ML20339A221), “generate a reactor trip above approximately 8% RTP (P-7 setpoint)”. The engine carried the generic Westinghouse 10 % (WTSM 10.3 §10.3.4.3) until then, and at 10 % this permissive CHATTERED: the power-range channel at the 9.6 % initial condition spans 8.7 to 10.5 %, so p7_met took 92 transitions in 600 s and both trips armed and disarmed with it
P-10Power ≥ 8 %Allows IR/PR low-setpoint trip blocks, and revokes a standing block below. The same crossing as P-7 (they used to be 8 % and 10 %). The block is graded against the INDICATED power-range channel, which carries about ±0.3 % of noise with no 2-of-4 coincidence behind it, so a block pressed just over 8 % is revoked within seconds: measured survival of one press is 1 s at 8.19 % power, 4 s at 8.72 %, 105 s at 9.10 % and indefinite from 9.36 % — which is why 04 PWR-T03 asks for a comfortable 10 % before you press
P-11Pressure ≥ 1973 psi (13.6 MPa)Below it the SI trip may be blocked; auto-reinstates above
P-12Tavg low 532.4 °F (278 °C)LO TAVG annunciator (PWR-A29) — ~14.4 °F (8 °C) below the 546.8 °F (286 °C) no-load anchor (Ginna's numeric P-12 is in its TS proper, fetch owed)
SR re-energize blockIR ≥ 1e-6 ANOT MODELLED on this plant. It stops the counter being switched back on at high flux. Here clearing the SR block is never refused — above 1e5 cps it trips the reactor instead. Kept for the contrast — the real interlock exists and the retired engine enforces it

Rod withdrawal interlocks — the four rod stops

Rod stopBlocks withdrawal whenNotes
Power range high fluxpower range power > 103 %Not blockable. Sits below the 115 % high-setting trip: the stop acts first, the trip is what happens if it does not hold
Intermediate range high fluxintermediate range > 20 % current equivalentBlockable at P-10, on the INTERMEDIATE RANGE trip’s own control — one press takes the 25 % trip and this stop together. It rode the 35 % low-setting flux trip’s control in older revisions, which was the wrong lever: WTSM 12.2 lists P-10’s functions as two separate operator actions, “1. Allows the operator to manually block the intermediate range high flux trip and the C-1 rod stop, 2. Allows the operator to manually block the low setpoint power range high flux trip”. That block is the power-ascension step, and it is why this stop is a startup interlock rather than an at-power one
Overtemperature ΔTOTΔT margin ≤ 3 % of rated ΔT (clears above 6 %)Also drives the turbine runback — see below
Overpower ΔTOPΔT margin ≤ 3 % of rated ΔT (clears above 6 %)Also drives the turbine runback
Insertionnever blocked, by any of them

All four are sourced together, WTSM 8.1 §8.1.7.3 (ML11223A252), Manual Rod Withdrawal Stops, and corroborated on the anchor plant — Ginna UFSAR ch7 (ML20339A027): *"The overpower rod stops are initiated by one-out-of-four high nuclear flux of 103 %; one-out-of-two high flux at 20 % current equivalent power; two-out-of-four high overtemperature delta T at 3 % of rated loop T below trip setpoints; and high overpower delta T at 3 % of rated."*

"Rated ΔT" is 58.9 °F (32.7 °C) — this plant's own settled hot-full-power loop split, so the 3 % rod stop is 1.8 °F (1.0 °C) of ΔT and the 6 % clear is twice that. Every overtemperature and overpower ΔT number on this page is a fraction of that one figure, and it is the plant's OWN reading rather than a design target: the source defines it that way — USNRC HRTD 12.2 (ML11223A301) and NUREG-1431 Rev 4 (ML12100A222) both say *"ΔT₀ = indicated ΔT at rated thermal power"*. Added 2026-09-06, when the constant behind it was found to be 56.0 °F (31.1 °C), a figure sourced to nothing and 5 % below what the plant actually reads — which put a healthy plant 5 % into both ΔT bands before anything happened. The manual had never printed the number at all, which is part of why it went three weeks unnoticed.

Pressing WITHDRAW into a standing rod stop is refused, and the refusal names which stop. Inward motion still takes — that is the source's own scope, quoted at the end of this section.

There is no startup-rate rod stop, and this table used to say there was. It listed a withdrawal block at 1.5 DPM clearing below 0.8, and the SUR readout on the board painted a red band there. No source in the corpus contains such an interlock; the figure came from the retired engine's control tables, which the board was still reading. **Measured before the fix: the plant ran to 10.00 DPM — 6.7× the band it was painting — across 90 consecutive withdrawal commands with none refused, and stopped only at a reactor trip. The band is gone. The SUR HI alarm at 1 DPM is real and stays**: it is an annunciator, not an interlock, and it is still the right thing to watch on a startup.

The ΔT rod stops are the OTΔT / OPΔT trip's own early warning, three percent before it fires, and they annunciate as OTΔT ROD STOP / OPΔT ROD STOP on Panel A. Sourced: WTSM 12.2 §12.2.3.7–.8 and Table 12.2-2 rows C-3/C-4 — "Loop ΔT > (OTΔT reactor trip setpoint − 3%)… Stops control rod outward motion (manual & automatic) and initiates a turbine runback." The turbine runback is built, and it is the half that acts rather than refuses. When the ΔT margin has HELD below the rod stop for about 8.5 seconds — a brief dip does not count, and that delay stands in for the two-out-of-four loop voting a single-loop plant cannot have — the plant reduces the generator load target by 5 % of rated in about 1.5 seconds, then holds it steady for 28.5 seconds and looks again — if the condition has not cleared, another 5 % in the next 30-second interval, and so on. You will see the number in the Generator Load box drop in steps with nobody touching it. It does not put the load back afterwards; that is yours to do once the condition is fixed. It never touches the reactor: it reduces LOAD, and the core follows the load down through the moderator coefficient, which is why it works and also why it is not instant. Sourced: WTSM 11.3 Westinghouse Electrohydraulic Control System (ML11223A295), Turbine Runbacks — "the EHC system reduces load at 200%/min for 1.5 sec (a 5% load change), then holds the load constant for 28.5 sec. If the runback condition has not cleared, the load will be reduced by another 5% in the next 30-sec interval." Measured on this plant: a 15 % steam line break takes two steps to 90 MWe and becomes a ride-out instead of a reactor trip, while a 30 % break and a continuous rod withdrawal still trip — they outrun the coupling the runback works through. Like every rod stop here, it blocks withdrawal only — "The rods can always be inserted into the core using either manual or automatic rod control" (WTSM 8.1 §8.1.7.3).


3.0 Engineered safety & automatic actuations

**A NOTE ON psi vs psig, because this set mixes the two conventions and the difference is real. Every pressure printed in this manual set is absolute, and written psi** — the board writes it the same way, accumulator nitrogen included. It is a conversion of the engine's MPa, which is absolute. Where a source document's own figure is quoted, it keeps its psig. Real Westinghouse documentation quotes pressurizer setpoints in gauge (psig), and the two differ by one atmosphere, 14.7 psi.

The consequence is a small internal inconsistency, declared here rather than silently carried. Our nominal 2235 psi takes the real plant's 2235 psig and reads it as absolute — so it is 14.7 psi below the real operating point.

The PORV is not affected, because it is not a converted number at all. It lifts **100 psi above whatever the pressure setpoint is**, which is the real plant's own nominal-to-PORV margin taken directly, so the margin is exactly 100 psi and stays 100 psi wherever you put the setpoint. What the sourced 2335 psig figure gives us is the valve's rating point — the pressure at which "179,000 lb/hr" is the flow — not its lift point. (Before 2026-08-30 this paragraph claimed a fixed 2350 psi PORV and a 115 psi margin; that was the retired engine's.)

This is not being "fixed" by moving 2235. That number is the pressure anchor of the whole plant — every equilibrium, initial condition, alarm band and scenario is referenced to it — and re-anchoring it 14.7 psi to buy 15 psi of margin fidelity would re-baseline the entire model for no behavioural gain. Recorded 2026-08-12 so the next reader who spots the mismatch finds the reason instead of the discrepancy. Real values for reference (WTSM 10.2, ML11223A287): nominal 2235 psig, spray starts 2260 psig, spray full open 2310 psig, PORV 2335 psig, safeties 2485 psig.

FunctionInstrumentDirectionSetpointReset / notes
Open PORVprimary_pressurehighPress SP + 100 psi (0.69 MPa) — not a fixed numberReseat at SP + 85 psi (0.586 MPa), a 15 psi (0.103 MPa) deadband. At the 2235 psi (15.41 MPa) nominal setpoint that is 2335 psi (16.099 MPa) open, 2320 psi (15.996 MPa) shut. It reads the indicated channel, so a failed pressure instrument moves it
Open PZR safetyprimary_pressurehigh2500 psi (17.24 MPa)Reseat 5 % below, at 2375 psi (16.375 MPa) — the reseat fraction is sourced (Ginna ch15 Model 1: "did not reseat until the pressure dropped 5% below the opening setpoint"). Reads true pressure, not the channel: a spring valve cannot be fooled by an instrument
HPI start (Safety Injection)primary_pressurelow1715 psi (11.824 MPa)There is no ESF arm to set — this actuation is not defeatable, it latches, and securing the pumps needs the reset permissive (03 §17.4). Arrives with the low-pressure trip
HPI start (SI on low steam pressure)steam_pressurelow328 psi (2.26 MPa)The secondary-side entry to the same SI latch — a steam-line depressurization actuates injection without the primary ever reaching 1715 psi (11.824 MPa). This row was missing from the manual entirely until 2026-08-30
HPI start (SI on high-high steam flow)sg_steam_flowhigh1.55 of ratedThird entry to the SI latch
HPI start (SI on PZR level lo-lo)pzr_levellowNOT MODELLEDA real plant carries an inventory-protecting SI path that fires on level even while the heaters hold pressure. This plant's engineered-safeguards list has four entries — three primary/steam-side plus the containment-pressure backup below — and this is not one of them, so on a slow inventory loss nothing starts injection until pressure itself reaches 1715 psi (11.824 MPa) or the loss eventually pressurizes containment. Kept because the coupling is real operator knowledge — level and pressure are not the same signal — and because knowing which of the two your plant actually watches is the point. Formerly documented as live at 12 %, re-arming above 20 %; rides the HPI arm
Letdown isolationpzr_levellow17 % indicatedThis row declared the function absent until 2026-09-04, and was wrong — it contradicted §2.0's own PZR-level row and the engine, which has carried this isolation all along (pwr2_pressurizer, LEVEL.low_cut_pct). At 17 % indicated pressurizer level the plant isolates letdown to stop the leak-out path making a low level worse, and it stops both letdown paths: the orifices and the RHR-to-CVCS cross-connect. Annunciated PZR LTDN ISOL (§4.0); the same 17 % also cuts the pressurizer heaters (§6.0). It does not move your orifice selection and it does not restore itself. The latch clears when level recovers past 20 %, but letdown stays shut until you re-select an orifice by hand — the restoration is an operator act (WTSM §4.1.3.1, ML11223A214: "The letdown orifice isolation valves automatically close on low pressurizer level", and nothing in that chapter re-opens them). Response: 06 PWR-A13a. ⚠ Whether the real interlock reaches HCV-128 (the cross-connect) or only the normal-line valves is unverified; this plant stops both, by ruling
Feedwater isolation (on SI)primary_pressurelow1715 psi (11.824 MPa)Sourced 32 s delay behind the LATCHED SI signal (Ginna Table 15.0-6, "Feedwater Isolation Delay from SI … 32.0"), and it is held time, not edge — a reset that clears SI inside the 32 s cancels the isolation. There is no HPI arm for it to ride
Atmospheric dump (ADV)steam_pressurehigh1055 psi (7.272 MPa) — the sourced 1040 psigSHIPS IN AUTO. Vents to atmosphere, upstream of the MSIV and independent of the condenser: this is the cooldown path when the condenser is gone. In AUTO it holds a bottled generator at the setpoint instead of on the 1099 psi (7.58 MPa) code safeties — but capping pressure is not a cooldown; lower the setpoint or open the valve for that. Full open at 1078 psi (7.43 MPa); capacity ≈5 % of rated steam flow (4.98 %, measured — 8.18 kg/s of this plant's 164.2 kg/s rated flow). Sourced twice over: the WTSM §7.1.3.3 placement rule — "approximately half the difference between the no-load steam generator pressure and the lowest set pressure of the safety valves", which on the Ginna ladder (1020 → 1099 psi) is 1060 — and Ginna's own ARV solenoid band, 1005–1060 psig (UFSAR ch 10), which brackets it. Capacity was formerly quoted at 10 % — the same section's "approximately 10% of the rated steam flow … from each steam generator", Ginna's per-valve figure carried directly onto a plant with one generator instead of two. Corrected 2026-09-08: this valve's sourced function — decay-heat removal once the condenser is gone, Technical Specification Bases B 3.7.4 — scales with thermal power, not with how many steam generators the reference plant had, and that same Bases section gives its own cross-check for the identical hardware: "approximately 4% of RTP". Both figures describe one valve; this plant's 4.98 % sits between them. Setpoint box clamps to the same 29–1099 psi band as the Dump SP. Cools well past the 100 °F/hr limit at full open — see 12 §12.18
Main steam line isolation (MSLI)steam_pressurelowNOT MODELLEDOn low steam pressure or high steam flow, the main steam isolation valve on this plant closes only when you close it — no automatic signal on either leg. The containment leg is different — see the row below: a high-high containment pressure closes this same valve automatically. The valve itself is real (03 §17.5). Formerly documented as a rate-compensated 600 psi (4.14 MPa) leg in coincidence with sg_steam_flow > 1.25 of rated
MSLI (containment leg)containment_pressurehigh44.7 psi (0.308 MPa) absolute — the sourced 30 psig hi-hiBuilt. The same bistable that starts containment spray (two rows below) also shuts the main steam isolation valve — one signal, two consumers, sourced together, WTSM 12.3: "(1) a high-high containment pressure signal or (2) high steam flow coincident with…", this is signal (1). The valve latches shut; nothing re-opens it automatically. Measured, cold-leg LOCA failure at full size (severity 1.0), full power: shuts at 59.6 s
SI backup (containment)containment_pressurehigh18.1 psi (0.125 MPa) absolute — the sourced 3.5 psigBuilt, and unblockable — WTSM 12.3: "This SI actuation signal cannot be blocked by the operator." Unlike the other three SI paths, P-11 does not gate it. The high-energy-line-break backup: starts injection on building pressure when the primary has not yet fallen far enough on its own. The pressure must hold past the setpoint for 2.0 s before it actuates — [derived], carried from the other SI channels; a real plant votes 2-of-3 transmitters here, this single-channel plant filters in time instead. Measured, cold-leg LOCA failure at full size (severity 1.0), full power, injected at t = 0: this is still the first SI path to latch, at 5.56 s; the reactor has already tripped on overtemperature ΔT at 4.76 s. It trips the reactor whenever it is the first thing in: a full-severity reactor coolant pump seal leak latches SI and trips the reactor together at 7.5 min, full stack
Containment spraycontainment_pressurehigh44.7 psi (0.308 MPa) absolute — same bistable as the MSLI row aboveBuilt, auto-only — no board control, no player lever. One credited train (the sourced post-single-failure configuration, Ginna TS Bases B 3.6.6), 1800 gpm (6.81 m³/min) of 50 °F (10 °C) refueling-water-storage-tank water, 28.5 s response from demand to delivery. Releases when containment falls back below the SI-backup setpoint above — a declared inference, since no source documents a spray reset. No RWST inventory node exists, so spray runs for as long as it is demanded rather than draining a tank (12 §12.4d). Measured, cold-leg LOCA failure at full size (severity 1.0), full power: demanded at 59.6 s, delivering at 88.2 s; mitigated containment peak 57.8 psig (0.500 MPa) against 78.5 psig (0.643 MPa) unmitigated. A station blackout defeats it — spray is an AC load and stays dark
Fan coolers, safety realignhpi_activeis_truerealigns on any safety injection, not a containment setpoint of its ownBuilt — Ginna TS Bases B 3.6.6: "In post accident operation following a SI actuation signal, the CRFC System fans are designed to start automatically if not already running." Two units credited (post-single-failure), 44 s response. One-shot, no automatic securing. The slower, diverse train — GEND-061: "Heat transfer from the containment atmosphere to containment sprays is rapid compared to heat removal by containment coolers" — measured 3.9 MWt against spray's 9.2 MWt at the mitigated peak. Measured, cold-leg LOCA failure at full size (severity 1.0), full power: realigned at 49.5 s. A station blackout defeats it too — the fans are AC loads
H₂ recombiners, auto-startctmt_h2_pcthighNOT MODELLEDctmt_recomb_demand and ctmt_recomb_active are declared static false. Containment hydrogen itself is real — it is computed from the oxidation and published as ctmt_h2_pct — so it accumulates on a damaged core and nothing removes it. Formerly documented as starting at 0.5 % vol and securing at 0.2 % vol
H₂ flammability alarmctmt_h2_pcthigh4.1 % volThe sourced lower flammability limit of hydrogen in air (NUREG-1431 Bases). Alarm only (PWR-A40) — nothing actuates on it; the response is at the core
H₂ ignition (the burn)true concentrationhighNOT MODELLEDctmt_h2_burned is declared static zero: hydrogen reaches the flammability limit on this plant and does not ignite. Formerly documented as a one-time deflagration at 8.0 % vol — a bracketed template value corroborated by TMI-2's estimated 7.9 % (GEND-061). The alarm above still tells you the mixture got there, which is the operator-relevant half
AFW startsg_levellow17 %Same signal as the lo-lo reactor trip (single-signal). There is no arm to set — the actuation is inside the engine, no operator command disarms it, and the board AUTO button is a lamp (03 §17.4)
AFW start (loss of MFW, PI-4)fw_flowlow0.10 normalizedAbove P-9 (≥50 % power)
MFW isolation + AFW start (P-4)tavglow554.0 °F (290.0 °C) indicatedCondition: reactor tripped (P-4). Shuts main feed after a trip so it cannot overcool the plant. Not latched — it stands while the trip is in and indicated Tavg is below the line, and clears when either goes; it has no reset of its own. Logic sourced: WTSM 12.3.6.1 (ML11223A310), "Low Tavg (564°F) coincident with a reactor trip (permissive P-4)"; WTSM 12.2 (ML11223A301) seals P-4's isolation in only for SI and high level. Setpoint derived: the source sets it 7 °F (3.9 °C) above its 557 °F (291.7 °C) no-load Tavg (WAT 05, ML11216A094); this plant's no-load Tavg is 547 °F (286.1 °C). Ginna, the anchor plant, has no such function (TS Bases B 3.3.2 Function 5). ⚠ Starting both AFW pumps on it is a DECLARED DEPARTURE. The source plant gets AFW from the SG low-low level start, which its trip reaches because the SG level shrinks. This plant's SG level swells on a trip instead — 64.7 % to 70.6 % in the first 30 s — so on the sourced logic alone the isolated generator boiled down to the 17 % low-low start about 16 minutes after the trip. Measured, manual trip from full power: Tavg passes the line about 40 s after the trip, main feed isolates and both AFW pumps start; AFW flow begins near 9 minutes, when SG level has fallen to the AFW level hold, and level settles near 35 %. Tavg bottoms near 548 °F (286.7 °C) — no overcooling
SR re-energize assistintermediate_rangelow1e-10 AActuation path as configured
Open SG safetysteam_pressurehigh1099 psi (7.58 MPa)Reseat 1063 psi (7.33 MPa). The pop is Ginna's first-lift main steam safety valve, 1085 psig (UFSAR ch 10 §10.3.2.4), and the plant models that section's staggered bank — one valve there and three at 1140 psig (1155 psi / 7.96 MPa), each reaching full lift at its own +3 % accumulation, so the upper stage does not lift on a plain turbine trip. The bank's full-lift capacity, 0.84× rated steam flow, is NOT a sourced figure — corrected 2026-09-08. It is Ginna's ratio after its uprate, while the same chapter's stated design basis sizes the bank at 100 % of design steam flow; the scale is under review and the per-valve shares are unaffected
Turbine trip (vacuum)condenser_vacuumlow22 inHg (74.5 kPa)Reset region 25 inHg (84.7 kPa)
Turbine trip (overspeed)turbine_rpmhigh1980 RPMReset below ~1800 RPM. CONFIGURED BUT NOT REACHABLE in this simulator — there is no turbine roll model, so the rotor is either pinned at rated by the grid or coasting down. Measured peak: 1800 RPM on line in Follow, 1800 in Manual with a 2×-rated MWe demand, 1799 with the MSIVs shut and the breaker closed. Declared at 12 §12.14; pinned by run_reachability B3
Turbine trip (SG hi-hi / P-14)sg_levelhigh90 %Re-arm below 85 %
Steam dump (pressure mode)steam_pressurehigh1020 psi (7.03 MPa)= Ginna's sourced 1005 psig no-load point (TS Bases B 3.3.2) = Psat(546.8 °F (286 °C)), the no-load Tavg anchor; capacity 28 % of rated steam flow — Ginna's own (UFSAR ch 10, adopted after the full-rejection ride-out measured survivable at it). This is the value in the Dump SP box, and the controller reads it in this mode only. The mode is SELECTED, not permanent: pressing STEAM DUMP AUTO with the turbine tripped selects it — heatup, cooldown, hot standby (WTSM §11.2; 03 §12.3). The cold plant boots with the controller out of service, so on a heatup the selection is an operator action
Steam dump (trip-open mode)tavg error—opens on the Tavg error above the no-load reference; full demand 33.1 °F (18.4 °C) above itInside Tavg mode, which is what AUTO selects with the turbine on line. On turbine trip; needs the condenser (unavailable on lost vacuum / MSIV shut). The band is this plant's own Tavg program span — 547 → 580.1 °F (286.1 → 304.5 °C) — so full demand arrives exactly at full-power Tavg, which is the structure the source itself uses. It was the reference plant's 27.7 °F (15.4 °C) span borrowed as a gain, and saturated 5.4 °F (3.0 °C) short of full power. ⚠ It opens from the 547 °F (286.1 °C) reference, 4.2 °F (2.3 °C) BELOW the atmospheric dump valve's 1040 psig (7.17 MPa) relief point (saturation 551.2 °F (288.4 °C)) — measured 2026-09-06. That ordering inverted when the no-load anchor moved to 547 °F, so the earlier note here — that a plant left in Tavg mode while heating up rides the ADV instead — is refuted, and the heatup ride says so directly: left in Tavg mode the plant parks at 547.4 °F (286.3 °C) / 1006 psig (7.04 MPa) with that valve shut and 0 lbm vented, against 551.6 °F (288.7 °C) / 1042 psig (7.29 MPa), the valve at 8.1 % and 11,005 lbm (4,992 kg) vented in two hours when the dump is never selected at all. Steam-pressure mode is still the heatup / cooldown selection — WTSM §11.2, and it is the only mode that reads the Dump SP box
Spray flow cap——12 % of full spray flowSized for step insurges; cannot suppress a loss-of-heat-sink repressurization
Main feedwater isolation (P-14)sg_levelhigh90 %Latches (manual restore); AFW unaffected. Re-arm below 85 %

HPI pump curve (merged HPI/LPI)

AFW delivery


4.0 Alarm setpoints

Panel A — Reactor / primary

IDNameInstrumentDirSetpointPriority
reactor_tripREACTOR TRIPrps_scrammedtrue—critical
high_fluxHI FLUXpower_rangehigh108 %critical
high_tavgHI TAVGtavghigh594 °F (312.2 °C)warning
low_tavgLO TAVG (P-12)tavglow532.4 °F (278 °C)warning †
cooldown_rate_highRCS COOLDOWN RATE HItavg_ratelow−100 °F/hr (−55.6 °C/hr)warning
heatup_rate_highRCS HEATUP RATE HItavg_ratehigh100 °F/hr (55.6 °C/hr)warning
pzr_pressure_highPZR PRESS HIprimary_pressurehigh2300 psi (15.86 MPa)warning
pzr_pressure_lowPZR PRESS LOprimary_pressurelow2149 psi (14.82 MPa)warning †
pzr_pressure_loloPZR PRESS LO LOprimary_pressurelow1800 psi (12.41 MPa)critical †
porv_openPORV OPENporv_indicatoropen—warning
sur_highSUR HIstartup_ratehigh1 DPMcaution
sr_high_fluxSR HI FLUXsource_rangehigh5e4 cpscaution
subcooling_lowLO SUBCOOLsubcooling_marginlow20 °F (11.1 °C)warning
subcooling_lostSUBCOOL LOSTsubcooling_marginlow0 °F (0 °C)critical
pzr_level_highPZR LVL HIpzr_levelhigh75 %caution
pzr_level_lowPZR LVL LOpzr_level_devlow20 % below programwarning
pzr_level_dev_highPZR LVL DEV HIpzr_level_devhigh10 % above programcaution
pzr_level_cutoffPZR LTDN ISOLpzr_levellow17 %warning
pzr_level_loloPZR LVL LO LOpzr_levellow12 %critical
rod_limitROD INS LIMITrod_at_limittrue—warning
rod_max_travelROD BANK FULL OUTrod_at_max_traveltrue—warning
otdt_approachOTΔT ROD STOPotdt_marginlow3 % of rated ΔTwarning
opdt_approachOPΔT ROD STOPopdt_marginlow3 % of rated ΔTwarning

Panel B — Secondary / systems

IDNameInstrumentDirSetpointPriority
sg_level_hihiSG LVL HI HIsg_levelhigh88 %critical
sg_level_highSG LVL HIsg_levelhigh75 %caution
sg_level_lowSG LVL LOsg_levellow30 %warning
sg_level_loloSG LVL LO LOsg_levellow17 %critical
rcp_tripRCP TRIPrcp_runningfalse—critical ‡
hpi_activeSAFETY INJECTIONhpi_activetrue—critical
sboSBOstation_blackouttrue—critical
turbine_tripTURB TRIPsteam_demand_lowtrue—warning †
load_imbalanceLOAD IMBALsg_imbalance_activetrue> 4 % of rated (4 MWe)caution
msiv_closedMSIV SHUTmsiv_openfalse—warning
sg_press_highSG PRESS HIsteam_pressurehigh1063 psi (7.33 MPa)caution
cond_vac_lowCOND VAC LOcondenser_vacuumlow25 inHg (84.7 kPa)caution
cond_vac_tripCOND VAC TRIPcondenser_vacuumlow22 inHg (74.5 kPa)warning
rcp_cavitationRCP CAVITATIONrcp_cavitatingtrue—warning
accum_alignedSI ACCUM ALIGNED < 1000 PSIprimary_pressurelow1000 psi (6.895 MPa) §caution

§ The only annunciator gated on a LINEUP as well as a reading. It requires the accumulator discharge isolation valve indication (accum_valve_open) to read open as well as pressure to be below setpoint, so a correctly-isolated Mode 5 plant — which sits below this pressure indefinitely — never sees it. The setpoint is where LCO 3.5.1 stops requiring the accumulators OPERABLE ("MODE 3 with RCS pressure > [1000] psig") and LTOP SR 3.4.12.3 starts requiring them isolated, leaving 400 psi (2.76 MPa) above their cover gas. There is no autoclose interlock and that is deliberate — see 06 PWR-A32.

§ RHR — the suction valve has TWO setpoints, and the autoclose is the higher one. The valve will not open above 440 psi (3.03 MPa) — the sourced 425 psig, WTSM §5.1. That is the block-open permissive: a gate on your open command, not a trigger, because there is no RHR start actuation. A standing-open valve autocloses only once pressure rises back above 600 psi (4.14 MPa). Both are sourced. NUREG-0933 Issue 99, "RCS/RHR Suction Line Valve Interlock on PWRs" (Rev. 3): "Two basic features are incorporated in the interlock design: (1) an automatic closure signal on high RCS pressure (typically 600 psig), and (2) a block of the manual open signal at a lower RCS pressure (typically 425 psig)." The Westinghouse Technology Systems Manual §5.1 (ADAMS ML11223A219) gives the same structure for valves 8701/8702 — open block 425 psig, autoclose ~585 psig.

Why the gap matters to you. Between the two setpoints the valve stays where it is. That is what keeps a plant hunting around the permissive from chattering the valve — and since nothing re-opens it but you (06 PWR-A33), a spurious closure is permanent until you act. Until 2026-07-31 this plant used one constant for both jobs, so the deadband was zero: a cooldown whose pressure-control setpoint sat at 409 psi (2.82 MPa) aligned RHR, rebounded nine psi, auto-closed, and never recovered. Practical consequence: do not read "below 400 psi" as the condition for keeping RHR — it is the condition for getting it. Once aligned you have to reach 600 psi (4.14 MPa) to lose it.

Setpoints do not move with plant mode — priorities do. Every setpoint above is fixed in every mode. What changes is classification: the annunciators marked † drop to Status in Mode 4 or 5, where the condition is the planned lineup rather than a casualty, and ‡ drops to Status whenever the pumps were stopped by the handswitch rather than lost. The alarm still comes in and still reads its instrument; the priority, the wording, and — because Status-class annunciators arrive pre-acknowledged — the ACK demand are what change. Full table, the exclusions, and what it does not cover: 06 §2.0.


5.0 Safety / damage limits (physics)

LimitValueMeaning
Fuel cladding damage2192 °F (1200 °C)Fission-product release begins (model)
Fuel melt5072 °F (2800 °C)Core melt (model)
Core uncovery heat-transfer collapseInventory < ~50 %Fuel-to-coolant coupling degrades
DNB entry (hot-leg subcooling)~14.4 °F (8 °C) marginHeat transfer degrades toward DNB regime

6.0 Pressurizer control bands (AUTO)

ParameterValue
Pressure setpoint2235 psi (15.41 MPa)
Heater proportional band30 psi (0.207 MPa)
Heater low-level cutoff / restore17 % / 20 % indicated PZR level
Heater bank elevation5 % – 15 % TRUE PZR level (unverified estimate; the elevation is sourced, the two figures are this plant's). Delivered heat scales with the wetted fraction of the band — entirely below the cutoff above, so it is reachable only when the level channel is lying
Heater ESF load shedsafety injection signal or loss of offsite power — latched; cleared only by an operator heater action, not by securing injection
Spray proportional band50 psi (0.345 MPa)

7.0 Rod drive

ParameterValue
Control bank max steps627 fully withdrawn (fine-step drive). Differential worth is 4.15 pcm/step off the bottom, 8.82 peak at mid-travel, 6.49 averaged over the bank; in the startup critical band it is 7.76 pcm/step = 1.19 ¢ (the 8.1 printed here until then was this plant evaluated 10 °F hot — see §7.5.1). ⚠ Do not quote the bank average as the critical-band figure: this plant's cent is 6.50 pcm (β_eff 650.2) and its bank average is 6.49 pcm/step, two unrelated quantities that happen to coincide, and neither is the value that applies during the approach to criticality
Speed slow / normal / fast8 / 48 / 72 steps/min (0.133 / 0.800 / 1.200 steps/s), the operator's three-position selector. Slow and fast are the sourced ends of the rod speed program — WTSM 8.1 (ML11223A252): "a minimum speed of eight steps per minute", and "a maximum rod speed of 72 steps/min. The maximum rod speed is based upon a maximum response to a large error signal and upon the physical limitations of the rod drive mechanism, with the latter being the limiting factor". Normal (48) is unverified — no document in the corpus carries it. The real programmer is continuous between the two limits (8, then 32 steps/min/°F, then 72); three positions is a simplification of the operator's switch, not of the program
Scram insertion time (control)~2.5 s full travel
Scram insertion time (shutdown)~2.0 s
Insertion limit (RIL)Power-dependent. Not applicable below 5 % power; above it the % withdrawn floor ramps linearly from 5 % to 70 % at 100 % power (≈ 10 % withdrawn at 12 % power, 70 % at full power = 439 of 627 steps). Drives the ROD INS LIMIT alarm and stops the automatic rod channel inserting further. The at-power initial conditions sit at 96.7 % withdrawn (606 steps), 167 steps clear of the limit, so it means "the bank is abnormally deep for this power"
Control worth (total group)4068 pcm (rod_worth_total = 0.04068) — WTSM 2.2 Table 2.2-1, all control banks
Shutdown worth (total group)3676 pcm (rod_worth_shutdown = 0.03676) — same source, all shutdown banks; all RCCAs together 7744 pcm


7.5 Estimated Critical Condition (ECC) — reference data

What pins this curve. Two independent anchors, and they constrain different things. Shape — the boron dependence — is measured: the BEAVRS / Watts Bar U1 Cycle 1 HZP physics tests (OSTI 1991715, Table IV) report isothermal temperature coefficients at three boron concentrations (975 ppm → −1.75 pcm/°F, 902 → −4.65, 810 → −8.01), which put the moderator coefficient's zero crossing at 986 ppm. Level — the ARO critical boron at hot zero power — is also measured, at 975 ppm from the same tests. Magnitude is measured too: both parameters are least-squares fitted to those same three points, which supersedes the earlier 2026-07-21 ruling pinning the full-power coefficient at −20 pcm/°C. The plant runs −26.8 pcm/°C there now, and reproduces all three measured coefficients to within 0.09 pcm/°F instead of missing two of them by 0.88 and 1.64. A test checks every one of them, and nothing in this curve is set by preference any more.

Critical boron concentration (ppm) by Tavg and control-bank position, shutdown bank withdrawn, no xenon, zero power:

Tavgbank IN (0)25 % (157)50 % (314)75 % (470)ARO (627)
122 °F (50.0 °C)8118499109711010
200 °F (93.3 °C)7978379019651005
250 °F (121.1 °C)7868278949611002
300 °F (148.9 °C)772816886955999
350 °F (176.7 °C)755802876949996
400 °F (204.4 °C)734784863942992
450 °F (232.2 °C)707761848934988
500 °F (260.0 °C)670730827922983
545 °F (285.0 °C)622690800908977
546.8 °F (286.0 °C)619688798908977

*(Re-measured 2026-09-03 on the shipped engine, RD.pwr2.kinetics.criticalBoron, against the 627-step bank. It previously described the RETIRED engine's 912-step bank, and so did the gate that was supposed to catch the drift — see the note below. The bank-IN and ARO columns barely moved; the 25 % and 75 % columns did, because this plant's worth curve is a different shape: curve_flatten 0.36, the four-bank overlap program of WTSM 8.1 §8.1.5.4.)*

Every cell is computed at normal operating pressure, 2235 psi (15.41 MPa), including the cold rows — which is a stated simplification, not a claim that a 122 °F plant is at 2235 psi. Boron is a density coupling, so pressure moves these numbers: the same 122 °F bank-IN cell reads 818 ppm at a realistic cold-shutdown 363 psi (2.5 MPa) against 811 ppm here, and the spread is largest in the bank-IN column and smallest at ARO. **Read the cold rows for the temperature lesson in §7.5.1, not as a dilution target for a depressurized plant.**

Differential boron worth (pcm/ppm). It is larger cold — denser water carries more boron atoms per unit volume — so the same dilution buys more reactivity at 122 °F than at power. Use the value for the temperature you are actually at.

Tavg122 °F250 °F350 °F450 °F545 °F566.6 °F
pcm/ppm20.4618.7716.8914.4811.4510.59

Control-bank integral worth (pcm added, withdrawing from fully inserted). The curve is an S: least effective at either end, most effective mid-travel.

Position10 %25 %35 %50 %65 %75 %90 %ARO
steps63157219314408470564627
pcm added271786123220382836328237974068

7.5.1 Reading the table — and the one rule that matters

WARNING — do not dilute toward a hot boron figure while the plant is cold. Read the first column of the table again: with the bank inserted, critical boron is **811 ppm at 122 °F (50.0 °C) and only 619 ppm at 547.0 °F (286.1 °C)**, this plant's no-load temperature. A number that is comfortably subcritical hot is critical, or worse, cold. This is not a modelling quirk — cold water is a better moderator, so a cold core needs more poison to stay shut down. Reaching Mode 3 at the no-load temperature before you dilute is what makes the dilution safe.

This is exactly how the real procedure handles it. WTSM 2.2 *Reactivity Balance Calculations* (ML11216A051), Attachment 2.2-1, note on line O: *"Since T avg is required to be >541°F, the reactivity change from moderator temperature is considered negligible."* A real ECC is only ever computed hot, which is why a real operator never faces this question. Our plant will let you drive it cold and dilute anyway, **and the source-range trip is what catches you — §2.0, 1e5 cps**, not blocked on a shutdown plant (since 2026-09-26; before that this plant had none). Measured, a runaway withdrawal from hot zero power at normal drive speed (full stack, 2026-09-26, times from rod_start): SUR HI at 267 s, SR HI FLUX at 298 s, the source-range trip at 304 s, rod 243 of 627. Once the source range has been blocked at P-6, what stands below P-10 (8 % power) is one caution and then two flux functions, in this order: **SUR HI at 1 DPM — an annunciator, not an interlock — then the intermediate-range high-flux rod stop at 20 % current equivalent, then the intermediate-range high-flux trip at 25 %**. Measured on a runaway withdrawal from hot zero power (2026-09-18; full stack, normal drive speed 0.800 steps/s — the normal rod speed — times given **relative to the start of withdrawal, i.e. the rod_start command, not engine boot): SUR HI at 267 s**, the rod stop at 338 s, the trip at 339 s. With the source range blocked, the annunciator is the whole of your early warning — nothing acts for you before the rod stop. *(Those three times were measured before the source-range trip existed; unblocked, the same runaway now trips at 304 s.)*

The acceptance band. Attachment 2.2-1 line Q brackets the prediction at ±750 pcm around the estimated critical position, or the rod insertion limit, whichever is tighter. On this plant's lumped bank the 719 ppm reference startup goes critical at 208 steps, and that gives a band of roughly 88 to 297 steps (ρ = −750 pcm at bank 88 and +750 pcm at bank 297, read off a one-step-at-a-time sweep with boron and T-avg held; 207 statically, 208 on the settled plant, one step being 0.66 °F of T-avg). The 223 steps / 111–310 printed here until 2026-09-14 was this plant computed at a benchmark anchor 10 °F above its no-load point — see 04 PWR-N02 §Step 15. The two tables above already said so, three paragraphs up: at 546.8 °F the bank-in critical boron is 619 ppm, so 719 ppm is 1137 pcm of boron to pull out (99.9 ppm at the 11.38 pcm/ppm measured there), and the integral-worth row puts 1137 pcm at about 206 steps — within two steps of the measurement, and seventeen from what the prose underneath them claimed. Work the tables; they are computed from the engine. Criticality outside the band means the estimate was wrong — stop and re-work it, do not keep pulling.

The band is checked against, not steered to. WTSM 19.0 (ML11223A342) Appendix 19-1 step 11 gives the response, and it is not a rod adjustment: if the bank goes critical below the 0 %-power insertion limit, reinsert all control rods to the bottom, recompute the estimated critical boron, borate to it, and withdraw again. NUREG-1431 Rev 4 Bases B 3.1.6 is explicit that the estimate "could be substantially in error" — it is a prediction with an acceptance band, never a target.

7.5.2 The calculation

Adapted from WTSM 2.2 Attachment 2.2-1 (Delta Rho Method). Work from a **last known critical condition**; every line is a reactivity difference between then and the startup you are planning.

LineQuantitySource
ABank worth at the desired startup critical position§7.5 integral-worth table
BBank worth at the last known critical conditionsame table
CC = A − B
DPower defect at the last known critical condition, × (−1)§11.0 by initial condition
EPresent boronCHEM SAMPLE (there is no live boron meter)
FBoron at the last known critical conditionrecords
GDifferential boron worth at your present Tavg§7.5 boron-worth table
HH = (E − F) × G
I / J / KXenon at startup / at last critical / K = I − J2500 pcm at equilibrium full power
OO = C + D + H + Kthe reactivity change needed
PP = O / G — positive means borate, negative means dilute

NOTE. The real worksheet also carries samarium (lines L–N) and drops the moderator term because Tavg is required above 541 °F. This plant does not model samarium separately, and it will let you sit below 541 °F — so if you are cold, the moderator term is not negligible and the §7.5 table, not this worksheet, is your reference.

7.5.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN — and why it is not the number the board shows you

SDM is computed with ALL RODS ASSUMED INSERTED except the single highest-worth rod, which is assumed stuck fully withdrawn. It is a calculated quantity, not a reading: it answers *"if the reactor tripped right now, how far subcritical would it be?"* — which is a different question from "how far subcritical is it right now?"

This manual set said "cold shutdown margin" for the second quantity until 2026-08-12. The two coincided only because the shutdown bank used to be parked withdrawn in Mode 5, which it no longer is (04 PWR-N01 step 2a). Measured on this plant at cold shutdown, 857 ppm:

QuantityValueWhat it is
Net reactivity, banks as they sit−4676 pcmboth banks in — what the plant is
Net reactivity, shutdown bank withdrawn−1000 pcmafter PWR-N01 step 2a
Boron's own contribution~1000 pcmthe trim target the initial condition is solved to
Shutdown bank worth3676 pcmthe margin a trip restores

The operational point. Withdrawing the shutdown bank does not make the plant unsafe — it is still 1000 pcm subcritical — but it spends the margin that was buying you time. Measured: an unattended dilution at the plant's make-up rate takes 79 minutes to reach criticality with the bank in; with the bank out it starts from −1000 pcm instead of −4676, so the same dilution gets there far sooner. And nothing stops it. This manual said that case "trips the source range inside the hour" until 2026-09-08 — there is no source-range trip on this plant (§2.0), so what the dilution buys you is indication only: the count rate climbing, **SR HI FLUX at 5e4 cps, and SUR HI** at 1 DPM once the rate is real. That is what a shutdown margin is for, and it is why the real procedure verifies it before the bank moves (ML11223A342 App 19-1 A.12 / C.8).

Applicability: NUREG-1431 LCO 3.1.1 — MODE 2 with k_eff < 1.0, and MODES 3, 4, 5. Commercial practice keeps boron sufficient for at least 1 % Δk/k (WTSM 19.2.1).

8.0 Operator training limits (authored standards)

ParameterTraining target
SUR on approach≤ 1 DPM — the SUR HI alarm sits exactly there, and it is the ONLY rate cue: nothing blocks withdrawal on rate (§2.0)
Reactor period≥ 30 s preferred on startup range
Power ramp ceiling~10 %/min class where achievable
Load imbalance (SG annunciator)&gt; ~4 MWe mismatch (4 % of rated) → filling/draining cue. Annunciated as LOAD IMBAL (Panel B, caution) — see §4. Reducing reactor power without walking the turbine load setpoint down is the usual cause in MANUAL, and it overcools the primary; the annunciator is the only thing that tells you.

9.0 Nuclear instrumentation scaling (reference)

DetectorScaling note
Source range~500 cps class at HZP source equilibrium; high scale ~1e6 cps near low power. Reads zero once blocked at P-6 (the block switches the detector off); unblocked, it trips the reactor at 1e5 cps. The P-6 point (IR 1e-10 A) sits at ≈ 3,100 cps on this scale
Intermediate rangeFull scale ~1e-3 A near ~12 % power (“maxes out ~10 %”)
Power range0–120 % calibrated scale; instrument reads to 200 % so a pegged meter can still cross the 115 % high-flux trip (strict crossed())

10.0 Load mode parameters

ParameterValue / behavior
Rated MWe100
Dispatch modesOne — the operator's load target. There is no Follow or Disconnected selector; the machine is taken off line with UNLOAD (03 §12.1)
Load-target ramp rate — RAISES ONLY5 % of rated per minute = 5 MWe/min, applied to a load increase. What you type is the dialled target and lands on the board at once; the effective target the turbine sees walks up toward it at this rate. 0 → 100 MWe is a 20-minute ramp. [sourced] Ginna UFSAR chapter 10, section 10.1.2.1 (ML20339A040)
Load reductionsNOT RATE-LIMITED — a cut takes effect at once, any size. Three reasons: a decrease swells the pressurizer rather than shrinking it into the 17 % cut, so it is the safe direction; it is the retired plant's own ruled design; and limiting it would put the dial's reduction rate exactly on C-7's arming threshold (row below), taking the graded steam-dump ride-out away from the operator. The source's "similar step and ramp load reductions are possible" is a statement of what the machine can absorb, not a limit on the operator
Step load changeNOT MODELLED. The same source allows a 10 % of rated step; a raise ramps in all cases, deliberately — one rule rather than two regimes (12 §12.0)
Ramp exemptionsEvery reduction; the OTΔT/OPΔT runback (200 %/min, and it carries the dial down with it); a turbine trip; and UNLOAD
C-7 loss-of-load dump armingOn a decrease faster than 5 %/min (§3.0) — the same sourced number as the raise ramp. Because reductions are not limited, a dial cut still arms it, as does UNLOAD

11.0 Normal values by initial condition

Expected readings at each named engine initial condition, captured from the live engine after settling 70 s at 10x, the same for every column — the low-power states are still walking their pressure up at 6 s, which is how the old table came to quote a hot-standby pressure 9 psi (0.06 MPa) light. These six are the whole list and the engine refuses any other name, but only five are on the Free Play picker: hot_full_power, 50_percent, low_power (listed as At Power — power ascension, added 2026-09-28), hot_zero_power and cold_shutdown. hot_shutdown is engine-only — real, loadable by the gates, not offered to the player.

low_power is where the startup walkthrough hands you the plant. Its control bank sits at 222 of 627 steps, which is what the startup actually hands over: Ginna UFSAR §15.4.5.1.1 (ML20339A101), "the reactor is operated with the RCCAs inserted only far enough to permit load follow." Since 2026-09-25 it is also xenon-free, like the plant the startup hands over — a core that went critical minutes ago, not one that has run at 10 % for days: that is why its boron reads 719 ppm (the startup's own concentration) and its xenon 0 %. Xenon then starts building the moment you load the plant, over about two days.

The other two at-power columns used to boot on the top stop, 627 of 627, and no longer do. They sit at 606 of 627 — 96.7 % withdrawn, the sourced full-power position: NUREG-1431 Rev 4 STS Bases B 3.2.3A (ML12100A228) puts control bank D "near its normal position (i.e., 210 steps withdrawn)" at high power, and with banks A, B and C fully out that is 627 − (231 − 210) = 606 on this plant's bank-overlap step scale (WTSM §8.1.5.4, ML11223A252). Booting on the stop left the operator no upward rod authority at all — measured full stack, commanding the bank out moved settled T-avg by −0.01 °F; from 606 the same command gives +4.67 °F (+2.59 °C), and insertion is unchanged. The design point itself does not move (T-avg, level, power and output are identical to 0.01 °F at every bank position from 439 to 627, because critical boron re-trims); only boron moves — 621 → 612 ppm at full power and 777 → 768 ppm at half.

RE-CAPTURED AGAIN, AND SO WAS §1.0 (hours after the note below). Two unrelated constants moved the at-power columns:

THE TWO PART-LOAD COLUMNS WERE RE-CAPTURED (after the no-load anchor moved). This plant's programmed no-load average coolant temperature (T-avg) is Ginna's 547 °F (286.1 °C), not the four-loop reference plant's 557 °F (291.7 °C) — in the T-avg program and in the pressurizer level program. Every reading between no load and full power moved with it, and 50_percent and low_power are the two columns that live there. T-avg falls 5.0 °F (2.8 °C) and 8.1 °F (4.5 °C) respectively. Subcooling margin is saturation temperature at RCS pressure minus T-hot, and the pressurizer holds a pressure setpoint — so saturation stays where it was and the margin gains what T-hot loses. That, and nothing else, is the +5 and +9 °F (+2.8 and +5.0 °C) in that row: at low_power T-hot falls 8.6 °F (4.8 °C) while saturation rises 0.4 °F (0.2 °C) on the 5 psi (0.034 MPa) of extra pressure, for +9.0 °F (+5.0 °C) of margin against the +8.8 °F (+4.9 °C) measured. Pressurizer level rises for a different reason: the level program is a straight line between the no-load and full-power T-avg knots, and moving the lower knot down makes that line shallower — 1.10 points of level per °F (1.98 per °C) where it was 1.58 (2.84) — so at any temperature below the full-power knot the programmed level is now higher. That is also why hot_full_power moved two points while hot_zero_power, hot_shutdown and cold_shutdown did not move at all: those three sit at the no-load knot or below it, where the program is already sitting on its 25 % floor and reads the same under either anchor. **That floor is why the error was invisible for two investigations** — the no-load point, which is the one anybody checks first, was never wrong.

MODE 5 EXISTS. The water-property floor moved from 14.5 psi (0.1 MPa) to 0.29 psi (0.002 MPa), so a steam generator can sit at ambient — the cold_shutdown column below is a real, loadable state whose secondary rides at 1.8 psi (0.0127 MPa), saturation at the plant's own 123 °F (50.6 °C). The cold end of the ladder is Mode 5, Cold Shutdown — 122 °F (50 °C), 363 psi (2.50 MPa) at boot, RHR in service, reactor coolant pumps secured, turbine tripped, both main feed pumps secured with level control in MANUAL, pressurizer heaters OFF and spray in hand and shut, both banks in. 5_percent remains the retired engine's and is refused by name. hot_shutdown IS NOT ON THE FREE PLAY MENU. The column stays because the initial condition is real, is booted by three gates, and is the reference for what a Mode 4 plant should read — but the player cannot select it. Measured when the question was put: Mode 4 and Mode 5 differ in exactly one independent quantity — temperature. 250 °F (121.1 °C) against 122 °F (50.0 °C); 105 of 122 true-state fields are identical and the whole lineup is the same, so the two were one choice the player could not act on. Modes 2 and 4 are transitions — you reach them by operating, which is why neither is a preset.

healthy board after selecting an IC, and as the "what should this read?" reference during evolutions. At steady state the indicated values track these true values through each instrument's lag and noise (see 03_CONTROLS_AND_INDICATIONS.md §16.0) — a mismatch that persists is either a transient in progress or a failed instrument.

Parameterhot_full_power50_percentlow_powerhot_zero_powerhot_shutdowncold_shutdown
Plant MODEAt Power (1)At Power (1)At Power (1) — engine only, not on the Free Play menuHot Standby (3)Hot Shutdown (4) — engine only, not on the Free Play menuCold Shutdown (5)
Reactor power (%)99.649.69.6~0 (source)~0 (source)~0 (source)
Generator output (MWe)100.050.010.0000
Control bank (steps of 627)606606222000
Tavg °F (°C)580.4 (304.7)563.9 (295.5)550.3 (288.0)547.2 (286.2)250.4 (121.3)123.0 (50.6)
T-hot / T-cold °F (°C)609.8 / 550.9 (321.0 / 288.3)579.2 / 548.5 (304.0 / 286.9)553.4 / 547.3 (289.7 / 286.3)547.2 / 547.2 (286.2 / 286.2)250.4 / 250.5 (121.3 / 121.4)123.0 / 123.0 (50.6 / 50.6)
Primary pressure psi (MPa)2247 (15.493)2243 (15.466)2240 (15.441)2246 (15.482)364 (2.510)363 (2.500)
Subcooling margin °F (°C)43 (23.7)73 (40.5)99 (54.9)105 (58.5)186 (103.6)313 (174.2)
PZR level (%)624429252525
SG level (%)656565376566
SG / steam pressure psi (MPa)827 (5.702)921 (6.349)999 (6.887)1020 (7.03)30 (0.207)1.8 (0.0127)
Steam / feed flow (norm.)1.000.500.10000
Fuel average temp °F (°C)1295 (701.5)893 (478.3)610 (321.4)547 (286.1)250 (121.1)123 (50.5)
Decay heat (%)6.233.110.60~0~0~0
Xenon (% of equilibrium)100660000
Boron (ppm)612768719719894918
Net reactivity (pcm)000≈ −1141≈ −5635≈ −5809
Source range (cps)0 (de-energized)0 (de-energized)0 (de-energized)≈ 501≈ 101≈ 98
Intermediate range (A)≈ 8.3e-3≈ 4.1e-3≈ 8.0e-4≈ 1.6e-11≈ 3.2e-12≈ 3.2e-12
SR detectorOFFOFFOFFEnergizedEnergizedEnergized
Condenser vacuum (kPa)93.298.099.8100.1100.1100.1
TurbineLatched, on lineLatched, on lineLatched, on lineLatched, off lineTRIPPEDTRIPPED
Turbine speed (RPM)180018001800000
Main feed pumpsBoth runningBoth runningBoth runningBoth runningBoth securedBoth secured
Feed control modeAUTO (three-element)AUTO (three-element)AUTO (three-element)AUTO (three-element)MANUAL, 0 %MANUAL, 0 %
Pressurizer heatersAUTOAUTOAUTOAUTOOFFOFF
Pressurizer sprayAUTOAUTOAUTOAUTOMANUAL, shutMANUAL, shut
MSIVOpenOpenOpenOpenOpenOpen
RHROut of serviceOut of serviceOut of serviceOut of serviceIn serviceIn service
ECCS mode indicatorstandbystandbystandbystandbyRHRRHR

Notes:


12.0 Related documents

These manuals are licensed CC BY 4.0 — see Legal. Training documents for an educational simulator, not licensing-basis documents for a real plant.